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Religion and Public Debate in a Liberal
Society: Always Oil and Water or
Sometimes More Like Rum and Coca-
Cola?
MAIMON SCHWARZSCHILD*
In the history of ideas, there is an association of religion with su-
perstition, fanaticism, intolerance, reaction, and, in short, illiberal-
ism. This association goes far towards explaining the commonplace
liberal impulse to exclude religion as a force in civil life. Liberals
often go well beyond advocating institutional separation of church
and state. Modern liberal thinkers like Ackerman, Dworkin, Nagel,
and - in a somewhat more qualified way -- Greenawalt all say that
religious arguments ought not even to influence public policy. In the
world of practical politics, the French Revolutionaries expressed
something of the same thought when they proposed strangling the
last aristocrat with the entrails of the last priest. Echoes of that Rev-
olutionary tradition reverberate in the surviving Communist coun-
tries and even in Mexico, where priests could not until recently vote
in general elections and are forbidden by law from appearing in pub-
lic in clerical dress. (When the Pope visited Mexico in the mid-
1980s, the President of Mexico shocked the traditionalists of his In-
stitutional Revolutionary Party by going to the airport to greet the
Pontiff - taking care, all the same, to insist that he went purely in a
private capacity.)
Liberalism does not, of course, spring from an intellectual or his-
torical vacuum. Political liberalism is an heir of the European En-
lightenment. Liberalism's core values are drawn directly from the
strand of Enlightenment thinking that advocated individual freedom,
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego; barrister of Lincoln's Inn, London.
a society of contract rather than of status, and public tolerance for a
broad range of private choices.
In its time, the Enlightenment was first and foremost an adversary
to orthodox religion. Although Enlightenment thinkers differed
among themselves on many points, including the existence and char-
acter of God, it is fair to say that the Enlightenment as a whole
beheld religion with something approaching horror. And most of the
Enlightenment philosophes certainly viewed orthodox religion as
deeply antagonistic to any possible liberal program.' There were
good reasons for the Enlightenment's stance in the context of early
modern Europe. But the reasons seem to me to have been contingent,
rooted in European history, and driven - at least to some extent -
by the peculiarities of the Christian religion. If so, then religion may
be uniquely inimical to liberalism at some times and in some places
but not in others. In fact, the Enlightenment stance towards religion
seems to me largely an anachronism in developed countries today,
and to that extent provides a quaint guide to the ethics of public
debate in a modern liberal society.
I. WHY WAS RELIGION THE BPTE NOIRE OF THE
ENLIGHTENMENT?
In the eyes of the Enlightenment, religion represented everything
unenlightened: the dark ages, dogma, feudalism, ignorance, intoler-
ance, inquisition, the Pit and the Pendulum, papal pretensions and
papal corruption, Spanish cruelties in the Americas and at home, the
suppression of scientific method, the thwarting of Galileo and the
burning of Bruno, status rather than contract, economic stagnation,
intellectual stagnation, moral stagnation, Gothic ugliness.
This polemic against religion might nowadays seem harsh, yet
many of its particulars did, after all, have a basis in reality. At its
1. For an excellent overview of Enlightenment thought, see PETER GAY. THE EN-
LIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION- THE RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM (1966), includ-
ing a thorough annotated bibliography of primary and secondary sources, id. at 423-555.
Throughout this Article, I generalise about the Enlightenment. There were, of course,
numerous Enlightenment thinkers and writers; often, they differed sharply amongst
themselves. Nonetheless, they tended to hold in common the ideas, themes, and preoc-
cupations I attribute to them. See generally the primary sources cited by Gay at 553-
555.
It has to be acknowledged, in this connection, that liberalism itself is by no means the
Enlightenment's only legacy. See J.L. TALMON, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOC-
RACY (4th ed. 1968), for a systematic and very persuasive argument that both liberal
democracy and totalitarian messianism are equally the products of eighteenth century
Enlightenment ideas. See also ARTHUR HERTZBERG. THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT AND
THE JEWS (1968) for a clear demonstration that modern, secular anti-semitism - an
important ingredient in many forms of illiberalism - took shape within the Enlighten-
ment, not as a reaction against it.
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height, the Enlightenment was a phenomenon of the eighteenth cen-
tury, and the truly devastating sixteenth and seventeenth century
wars of religion - the Thirty Years' War on the Continent, and the
English Civil War - were historically fresh in the memory of every
European. Thus, the Enlightenment associated religion in the most
direct possible way with death, destruction, and misery.' Perhaps
most importantly, the churches that confronted the Enlightenment
were monolithic, or at least had serious pretensions to being so: the
famous phrase "cuius regio, eius religio," which epitomized the
Peace of Westphalia and its settlement of the wars of religion, ex-
pressed the reality that within each European kingdom or princely
jurisdiction there was one and only one Established church (either
Roman Catholic or Protestant), allowing for no religious pluralism
in principle, and in practice often affording little tolerance, or none
at all, to religious dissenters.
Yet religion in the age of Enlightenment, while in principle mono-
lithic and intolerant, was also temptingly vulnerable. The Reforma-
tion and Counter-Reformation represented the crack-up of Western
Christendom. For many thoughtful Europeans, the possibility of
unquestioning faith, mediaeval-style, was an early casualty of the fu-
rious polemics between (and among) Catholics and the various
flavours of Protestants. Thus, for an Enlightenment critic and free-
thinker, religion was surely an easier target than were the rising ab-
solutist nation-states, many of whose rulers were generous (if conde-
scending) patrons and hosts to the Enlightenment philosophes.
II. How MIGHT THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION HAVE AROUSED
PARTICULAR ANTIPATHY FROM THE ENLIGHTENMENT?
The Enlightenment thinkers were men of secular temperament,
and the Christian religion has always had an oddly uneasy relation-
ship to the secular world and its values. Although Christianity be-
came the official religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth
century, it never fully merged with the temporal power, and always
preserved something of its early conviction that its Kingdom was not
of this world. Christianity did perpetuate pagan civilization to some
extent, by partially appropriating it: adopting and adapting the ad-
ministrative structure of the Roman Empire, for example, and using
2. For an assessment of the vast destructive effects of the seventeenth century
wars, see M.S. ANDERSON, WAR AND SOCIETY IN EUROPE OF THE OLD REGIME 1618-
1789, 63-76 (1988); see also JOSEF V. POLISENSKY, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (Robert
Evans trans., 1971).
the Greek and Latin languages. Yet Christianity certainly never em-
braced unconditionally the arts, crafts, values, or thought of the
classical civilizations. On the contrary, it was very characteristic of
Christianity to insist on a distinction between the sacred and the pro-
fane, with a tendency to relegate everything worldly and sensuous to
the realm of the profane. Hence Christianity bequeathed to Europe-
ans an ambiguous dual heritage of churchly religion on the one hand
and worldly civilization - always associated with ancient paganism
- on the other.
Down through the mediaeval centuries, pagan antiquity continued
to represent for Europeans the prime source for secular philosophy
(in the person of Aristotle above all), science (Archimedes, Euclid),
medicine (Galen), art (Graeco-Roman naturalism and perspective),
architecture (the classical orders, which the middle ages adapted or
distorted but never completely forgot), statecraft, and law. The
Church pronounced damnation on most or all of the pagan origina-
tors of these arts and sciences. But more important, the Church
tended to view these very fields of interest as secular: unreligious,
even if not irreligious. The interests persisted, of course, sometimes
with the Church's encouragement, but they were not really incorpo-
rated into Christianity: they occupied a separate sphere, divorced
from the sacred.
There were at least two relevant consequences of all this. First, by
excluding many "secular" interests from the religious sphere, the
Church was able to achieve (or at least to aspire towards and to
approximate) a greater uniformity in belief, and even in outlook and
style, than would otherwise have been possible. In practice, the
Church embraced a considerable variety of human types with quite
varying religious preoccupations. But by demarcating separate reli-
gious and secular spheres, the Church excluded many preoccupations
- and thus, inevitably, many human temperaments - from the re-
ligious category altogether. Hence, within the Church, there was less
need for pluralism or even for tolerance than might otherwise have
been the case.
Second, the classical arts and sciences, by virtue of their separa-
tion from religion, came to represent an implicit alternative to Chris-
tianity, a competing value system.3 To be sure, many individuals who
were drawn to these arts and sciences through the centuries were
3. Isaiah Berlin identifies Machiavelli as the first to make it clear that the classical
and Christian world views were contradictory and irreconcilable. For Berlin,
Machiavelli's importance is thus to anticipate the possibility of pluralism, the idea that
there are valid yet incompatible ideals which cannot be subsumed by any single Good.
See ISAIAH BERLIN, The Originality of Machiavelli, in AGAINST THE CURRENT: ESSAYS
IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 25 (1980).
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faithful Christians. But for many others, certainly from the Renais-
sance onwards, orthodox Christianity was almost beside the point.
The ethic which the arts and sciences fostered - especially in the
case of the sciences - included a degree of open-mindedness, recep-
tivity to evidence, and, hence, tolerance. There was little reason to
associate this ethic with Christianity. On the contrary, the idea of
tolerance was typically linked in the minds of Europeans to the
memory (or mis-memory) of pagan geniality and syncretism in the
ancient world. Thus, the groundwork was laid for the Enlightenment
thinkers, whose intense identification with ancient Greece and Rome
elided fairly smoothly into actual hostility to religion.
III. MIGHT OTHER RELIGIONS HAVE BEEN LESS WELL SUITED
As FOILS FOR THE ENLIGHTENMENT?
Christianity is not the world's only religion, nor Christendom its
only religious civilization. Among the world's religions, Islam and
Judaism spring to mind for purposes of comparison. Both Islam and
Judaism hold themselves out as integrated civilizations, not merely
as religions. In neither is the cleavage between sacred and secular so
stark as in Christianity. Neither is associated with the ghost of a
forerunner pagan civilization, with which secular values might be
identified.4
Accordingly, both in classical Islam and in Judaism, reason, state-
craft, law, even medicine and science are accepted in principle as
part of the religious culture. Mediaeval Islam recognized not only
clerics and mystics but also caliphs, conquerors, legalists, poets, phi-
losophers, and travellers as "religious" figures. As for Judaism, from
the very beginning the Hebrew Bible intertwined the personal histo-
ries of the founders of Israel, the national and military history of the
people, civil and ritual commandments, and priestly and prophetic
texts. The Talmud is even more all-embracing, and mediaeval Juda-
ism accommodated a spectrum that ran from the Kabbalists to the
rationalist Maimonides, for whom reason and science and Judaism
were all essentially a single enterprise. 5
4. The writings of Professor Bernard Lewis provide an accessible overview of Is-
lamic civilization. See, e.g., BERNARD LEWIS, THE ARABS IN HISTORY (1967), or - more
extensively - THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM (P.M. Holt et al. eds., 1970).
S. For a survey of mediaeval Jewish thought, see JULIUS GUTTMANN, PHILOSO-
PHIES OF JUDAISM: THE HISTORY OF JEWISH PHILOSOPHY FROM BIBLICAL TIMES TO
FRANZ ROSENZWEIG 47-265 (1964). For two good recent studies of Maimonides in par-
ticular, see MENACHEM KELLNER, MAIMONIDES ON JUDAISM AND THE JEWISH PEOPLE
(1991), and KENNETH SEESKIN, MAIMONIDES: A GUIDE FOR TODAY'S PERPLEXED
Islam and Judaism thus embraced a very wide range of interests,
values, and human temperaments, including many whose analogues
in Christendom were associated with the classical heritage rather
than with the Christian religious one. Islam and Judaism had to do
this, given their religious claim to jurisdiction over all of life, not
merely over a spiritual segment of it. By including more - in princi-
ple, everything - within the religious realm, these faiths were com-
pelled to a degree of pluralism, recognizing quite widely divergent
styles of thinking, including rationalist and even scientific styles, as
legitimately "religious."
This can be illustrated concretely. In the history of Christianity,
the early Church defined itself in a series of Councils that took place
during generally the same time period that the Talmud coalesced as
the foundation of Judaism. The differences are revealing. The
Church Fathers were intent on formulating a narrow orthodoxy,
from which any deviation would be anathema. The "battle of the i"
was perhaps the most notorious episode, in which it was finally de-
cided that the trinity of Persons in the Christian Godhead were
homo-ousian (of the same essence, or "consubstantial"), and hence
that it was damnable to believe them homo-iousian (of merely simi-
lar rather than identical substance).' In fact, defining and excommu-
nicating heretics - Arian, Donatist, Nestorian, monophysite,
monothelite, etc. - formed a large part of the early history of the
Church.' The Athanasian Creed (still canonical, at least in the
Anglican Communion) opens with a characteristic warning: "Who-
soever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the
Catholick Faith/Which Faith [the Creed goes on to define it in de-
tail] except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he
shall perish everlastingly.""
The Talmud, by contrast, is remarkable for its inclusiveness. It is
inclusive in the literal sense that it is made up of many different
elements: law primarily, but also stories, homilies, bits of lore, even
mathematical calculations. As a legal text, it is inclusive in the sense
that it is not so much a code of law as a record of legal discussions
and disagreements. The Talmudic rabbis argue over almost every
proposition of law, either disagreeing about what the law is, or at
least challenging the scope of the law and the sources of authority
(1991).
6. This dispute, along with many other theological disputes in the early Church, is
recounted with feline contempt in EDWARD GIBBON, I THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE 671-726 (Modern Library ed., undated).
7. For selections from the original sources of these early Christian controversies,
see JOSEPH C. AYER, A SOURCE BOOK FOR ANCIENT CHURCH HISTORY (1970). For a
modern history of the early Church in one (large) volume, free of Gibbon's Enlighten-
ment prejudices (and his genius), see W.H.C. FREND, THE RISE OF CHRISTIANITY (1984).
8. THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 27.
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for it. On many points of law, the Talmud records a majority view
and one or more dissenting views. Often, after a lengthy and compli-
cated legal dispute, having looked at the point from all possible an-
gles, the Talmud states no conclusion at all and does not indicate
what the law actually is. Thus, the Talmud scarcely implies that for
every question there is a single, right answer; still less does it imply
that believers in "wrong" answers are not to be tolerated. For practi-
cal legal purposes, the view of the majority usually prevails, but the
Talmud insists that its discussions as a whole are part of the Torah,
with the diverging views of all the sages thus partaking of divine
authority. As the Talmud says of the running controversy between
the Schools of Hillel and Shammai, "[the words of] both are the
words of the living God."9
None of this is to suggest that Judaism (much less Islam, nowa-
days) is a liberal utopia. There have always been counter-tendencies
within Judaism and Islam against pluralism and rationalism, some-
times very strong counter-tendencies indeed. 10 Few cultures in the
world, in fact, seem immune to conformity, narrow-mindedness, and
outbreaks of fanaticism. Still, Judaism and Islam are at least decen-
tralized: they lack the hierarchy (with a professional stake in defin-
ing what is orthodox and what is heretical) and the administrative
penchant for uniformity that Christianity, perhaps, inherited from
Imperial Rome.
What I am suggesting, then, is that religions like Judaism and
classical Islam might be less antithetical to pluralism, tolerance, ra-
tionalism, and the scientific method than the Enlightenment thinkers
found Christianity to be.
9. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Eruvin 13b. See also MISHNAH, Avot ("Ethics of the
Fathers") 5:17 ("Any controversy that is for the sake of Heaven shall stand legiti-
mate... What sort of controversy is for the sake of Heaven? Such is the controversy of
Hillel and Shammai.").
See generally Marc Angel, Authority and Dissent: A Discussion of Boundaries, 25
TRADITION no. 2, at 18 (1990). Rabbi Angel, a prominent Orthodox Rabbi, cites an
abundant Hebrew literature on intellectual freedom in the Jewish tradition, and argues
that dissent within the boundaries of normative Judaism is respected and even en-
couraged: "differences of opinion among our sages constitute the glory of the Torah." See
also Jeffrey I. Roth, The Justification for Controversy under Jewish Law, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 338 (1988).
10. See, e.g., Jost FAUR, IN THE SHADOW OF HISTORY: JEWS AND Conversos at
the Dawn of Modernity 9-27 (1992). Professor Faur documents an antirationalist wave
among Jews in mediaeval Spain, typified by the "banning" of Maimonides by the Jewish
community of Barcelona in 1305. Faur links the growing bad feeling between Jews and
Gentiles - culminating in the Expulsion of the Jews in 1492 - to the lowering of intel-
lectual and moral values among Spanish Jews as a result of anti-Maimonideanism.
Paradoxically, Christianity may actually have encouraged an an-
tireligious Enlightenment, and hence the development of secular mo-
dernity, by its segregation of sacred and secular, its historic
disposition to treat differences as heresies, and its unwillingness or
inability to embrace the values or even the personality types of the
sort of people who therefore gravitated to the Enlightenment. Is-
lamic society, by contrast, had its early - in many ways quite plu-
ralist - flowering, but then in recent centuries settled into general
stagnation; it never had an Enlightenment, and now seems to be hav-
ing enormous trouble accommodating the social and political fruits
of Christendom's Enlightenment."'
As for the Jews, there was an influential Jewish Enlightenment in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it illustrates how con-
tingent and peculiar to Christian conditions was the implacable hos-
tility of the (gentile) Enlightenment to the Church. The Jewish
Enlightenment was animated by many of the same values and aspi-
rations as its gentile counterpart: individual freedom of conscience,
scientific method, careers open to talent.12 But it never broke with
the Jewish religion in the way that the gentile Enlightenment broke
with Christianity. In particular, it would have been quite alien to the
Jewish Enlightenment to suggest that Judaism should have no influ-
ence on the public life of the Jewish people. If the key figure in the
European Enlightenment was Voltaire, whose attitude to religion
was "&rasez l'infjme," the key figure in the Jewish Enlightenment
was Moses Mendelssohn, a professing Jew, whose admirers associ-
ated him with the other great "Moses" figures of Jewish religious
history, the Biblical Moses and Moses Maimonides.1 3
IV. RELIGION AND LIBERALISM TODAY
The eighteenth century Enlightenment view of orthodox religion is
understandable, given the history of Europe in the foregoing centu-
ries, given some of the salient characteristics of the Christian reli-
gion, and given that the Churches still exercised considerable
11. For a history of the Muslim world's encounter with Western Europe, see BER-
NARD LEWIS, THE MUSLIM DISCOVERY OF EUROPE (1982). On the same theme, see also
Bernard Lewis, Muslims, Christians, and Jews: The Dream of Coexistence, NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 26, 1992, at 48.
12. There are good historical essays on the Jewish Enlightenment in TOWARD MO-
DERNITY: THE EUROPEAN JEWISH MODEL (Jacob Katz ed., 1987), and in FRANCES
MALINO & DAVID SORKIN, FROM EAST AND VEST: JEWS IN A CHANGING EUROPE 1750-
1870 (1990).
13. See MOSES MENDELSSOHN: SELECTIONS FROM His WRITINGS (Eva Jospe ed.
& trans., 1975). On the attitudes of Mendelssohn's admirers, see Lehmann, Maimonides,
Mendelssohn and the Me'asfim: Philosophy and the Biographical Imagination in the
Early Haskalah, 20 LEO BAECK INSTITUTE YEARBOOK 101-103 (1975).
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monopoly power at the time. Most of the Enlightenment thinkers
viewed religion as a threat to freedom, to pluralism, and to reason -
perhaps the most formidable threat they could imagine. Do religious
thinking, and religious arguments, pose a comparable threat to mod-
ern liberal institutions? Are religious arguments so incompatible
with the spirit of liberalism today that they, perhaps alone of all
types of arguments, ought to be disqualified from swaying public
debates?
Religion seems an odd choice as prime threat to liberalism at the
end of a century that has been so greatly dominated by struggles
over Communism, fascism, and extreme nationalism. The oddity is
compounded by the irony that each of these latter doctrines and
movements, like liberalism itself, has roots in the Enlightenment.
This is clearest in the case of Marxist Communism, which claimed
the mantles of science, of opposition to privilege, of being the party
of humanity - all quite consciously by way of claiming the Enlight-
enment mantle. Fascism and nationalism have a more equivocal link
to the Enlightenment, but fascism certainly traces some of its intel-
lectual ancestry to Rousseau's "volont gn~rale," and to the system-
atic anti-semitism of Voltaire and many of the philosophes;
messianic nationalism was foreshadowed in Montesquieu's ideas
about different peoples needing different constitutions, as well as in
the general Enlightenment hostility to the universalism associated
with the Roman Catholic Church. 14
For most of the twentieth century, at least outside the Islamic
world, illiberal politics have overwhelmingly been Communist polit-
ics, or the politics of essentially secular forms of fascism, national-
ism, or Third World socialism: the politics, one might say, of the
Enlightenment's illegitimate heirs, liberalism's bastard siblings.15
These movements, in our time, loosed the demons that the Enlight-
enment was supposed to exorcise: dogma, intolerance, mass enthusi-
asm, and total war.
It is often said that such movements are really godless religions.
The metaphor is attractive. Communism and Nazism certainly had
their holy books, their saints, their hymns and sacred symbols, their
14. See TALMON and HERTZBERG, supra note 1.
15. This formulation, of course, gives the Enlightenment the benefit of the doubt.
Pr.ofessors Talmon and Hertzberg, supra note 1, would take a bleaker view, namely that
modern illiberal politics are no less the legitimate heirs of the Enlightenment than liber-
alism itself.
dogmas and messianic promises, their heretics, their armed inquisi-
tions, their saved and their damned; they provoked their wars of reli-
gion, as well as producing a truly unprecedented toll in ruined lives
and scores of millions of deaths. They monopolized the societies they
dominated: they brooked no public opposition, and recognizing no
distinction between public and private, they were able to suppress if
not to eradicate private dissent as well.
In liberal societies, indeed, the case is sometimes made that the
viewpoints of these movements, or even viewpoints with roots in such
movements, should be excluded from public debate. Thus, the Ger-
man Constitution prohibits Nazi organizations. Nazi speeches and
even symbols are absolutely prohibited under German law.16 Com-
munism in America was treated similarly for some years towards the
end of Stalin's regime and immediately thereafter. 17
In some situations, such measures may actually be liberalism's
only hope. We might wish that Nazi street demonstrations had been
forbidden and Nazi speakers excluded from the democratic politics
of Weimar Germany. Even today, we might not lose much sleep over
the taboo on Nazi language and imagery in contemporary Germany.
Yet the analogous effort during the late 1940s and 1950s to eradi-
cate Communism from American life would probably find few de-
fenders nowadays even if its eponymous leading figure had been
someone other than the lamentable, unlamented Senator McCarthy.
This is really the perennial problem for liberalism: how to afford
tolerance, which, after all, is the essence of liberalism, to a wide va-
riety of different views of the Good, while not tolerating illiberal
ideas, which, if granted toleration, would proceed to devour liber-
alism. The'problem is by no means provoked only by religion. In-
deed, the problem might take on the dimensions of a general
paradox if liberalism itself turns out to have no view of the Good,
other than that various views of the Good ought to be tolerated, and
if any substantive view of the Good, at least whenever it actually
prevails, is in its nature coercive of alternate, contradictory views.
This is especially true if liberalism is deemed to frown upon coerced
compliance, say, with majority views of morality, and not merely to
16. See Basic Law (i.e., the Constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Article 21 (2) ("Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adher-
ents, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the exis-
tence of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be unconstitutional"). See also PENAL
CODE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, Title III §§ 84-86 (Joseph J. Darby
trans., 1987) (keeping, distributing, or publicly using flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans, or
forms of greeting of "a former National Socialist organisation" shall be punished by up
to three years' imprisonment or fine).
17. See, e.g., the Smith Act of 1940, upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), later limited as to when it could constitutionally
be invoked, in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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forbid restrictions on dissenting free speech.
It is no use suggesting that only religions, or ideas analogous to
religions, ought to be excluded from public debate, because almost
any idea of the Good - certainly any systematic body of principles
- can be analogized to religion, just as Marxism and fascism often
have been. Liberalism itself is sometimes accused of being a religion,
as is the "religion" of secular humanism. At the extreme, one could
imagine a bizarre, nightmarish liberalism so intent on tolerance that
it tolerates nothing at all, lest any idea should prevail and (then inev-
itably) coerce compliance from the holders of contradictory ideas. 8
Perhaps the key, at least to some of these problems, lies with the
idea of pluralism. The churches in the Age of Enlightenment were
still a monopoly power. Europe was homogeneously Christian - ex-
cepting only a few Jewish communities, persecuted and despised, and
a handful of freethinkers. Established churches could, and did, com-
mand general obedience. They could, and did, outlaw rival faiths,
and suppress ideas that they viewed as heretical, sceptical, or even
simply distasteful. The philosophes were quite right that their socie-
ties would never be liberal until religion's sway over public life was
sharply reduced.
The situation in the developed countries today is very different.
Whatever the rate of church-going - it is quite high in the United
States, lower in Canada, much lower in western Europe - we live in
societies that are essentially secular. We are sometimes described as
consumer societies, sometimes as materialist societies, but no one se-
riously suggests that we are living in an Age of Faith. George Orwell
said of religion that there must have come a moment, silently and
irreversibly, perhaps as early as in the late nineteenth century, when
the "Noes" had it: when a majority of people no longer believed in
the crucial tenets of their ancestral religions, or at least no longer
believed in them in the way that they believed, say, in the existence
of Australia.
Far from being in a position to squelch pluralism, religion today is
itself a riot of pluralism. The 1992 Statistical Abstract of the United
18. Professor Talmon suggested that something like this dynamic is actually at
work in what he called "totalitarian democracy", see supra note 1. Starting from the
premise that freedom is the supreme virtue, said Talmon, the totalitarian messianist rea-
sons that persons who are "truly free" will act in accordance with a single model of
collective virtue, and that it is only right and proper to force people to be "free." "Politi-
cal correctness" in American academic circles may be driven by an analogous dynamic.
See DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAM-
PUS (1991).
States lists 80 religious bodies with more than 50,000 adherents, and
this is a skeletal list: Jews, for example, are one entry - there is no
indication that they are religiously divided and denominationalized.1 9
The 1991 World Almanac lists 150 separate religious groups in the
United States, and even these appear to be fairly "main-line": the
Church of Scientology and the Rev. Mr Moon's Unification Church
are not included, for example, nor similar institutions, although
America has many such bodies, not by any means restricted to Cali-
fornia.20 The religious supermarket in other developed countries, like
the real supermarkets, probably still offers somewhat fewer selec-
tions than in America, but not radically fewer, and the tendency in
this as in other areas is towards the American model.
In such circumstances, there is hardly an immediate prospect that
any one religion will come to dominate the national life, with power
to suppress rival creeds or to persecute nonbelievers. Nor is there an
ecumenical "religious" view of public policy. In their attitudes to-
wards political questions, religious groups in the developed countries
run the gamut (and not just, as Dorothy Parker said, from A to B).
Many are quietist. Others have one or two pet public issues. Some
tend to be politically liberal or conservative across the board; some
are on the radical left or the far right. Quite apart from the ethics of
public debate in a liberal society, there is scarcely much practical
mileage to be had for such religious groups to argue from authority
on public questions. "Vote against abortion because the Pope says
so," or "Support the Sandinistas because the National Council of
Churches says so," will persuade only those already persuaded: if
anything, that sort of argument is likely to sow doubts among the
faithful.
Religion, in short, is not remotely the threat to pluralism that it
was in the Age of Enlightenment. And if possessing coercive convic-
tions - rooted in empirically or logically unprovable premises - is
to be the criterion for being excluded from public argument, a great
many secular movements and ideas would surely cry out for exclu-
sion together with, or long before, religion.
There is another dimension, moreover, to the argument about reli-
gion in public debate. The Enlightenment thinkers saw religious or-
thodoxy as an obstacle to progress, science, free choice, the society of
contract, and material civilization. In the eighteenth century, all
these were new and precarious things, tender shoots, intimations of a
modernity that might yet die aborning.
19. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, Table 77, 56-57 (1992).
20. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 609-10 (Mark S. Hoffman et al. eds.,
1991).
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No longer. The precarious things now, if anything, are what mo-
dernity sometimes seems to sweep away: meaning, connection to the
past, identity, community, purpose, the spiritual side of life. This has
certainly been an overwhelming preoccupation of twentieth century
social criticism: key words and phrases include "alienation" and
"corrosion of values," the Lonely Crowd and the Culture of Narcis-
sism. The criticism extends from Marxists to traditionalists to the
op-ed writers of your choice. What is implicit is that modernity, far
from being vulnerable, is triumphant, even to the point that
counterweights might now be desirable.21
Perhaps this social criticism is unjustified. Perhaps modern life is
no more empty, ugly, or alienated than life under any other dispen-
sation. Or if that is not quite right, perhaps secular modernity has
answers to these problems, or at least persuasive things to say about
human ends as well as about means.
But, as the Jewish joke puts it, there are really only two possibili-
ties. Either the values of secular modernity can hold their own in a
reasonably free marketplace of ideas, in which case they ought to be
able to do so without stigmatizing religious arguments as somehow
illegitimate or out of bounds. Or they cannot hold their own, because
too many people are dissatisfied with the way of life that a purely
secular modernity offers. In which case liberal society would surely
owe it, not only to religious groups but also to itself, to give these
groups a hearing.
In the last analysis, perhaps the best justification for liberalism is
value pluralism: the idea that there are many conflicting Goods in
the world, genuinely Good and genuinely conflicting, not reconcilable
in any rational synthesis embodying the Greater Good.22 Liberal tol-
erance allows for rough and shifting compromises among the various
and conflicting Goods. A liberal society ought to embrace as many of
the world's contradictory Goods as it can possibly carry. And reli-
gious values are surely among these Goods. Today's religious groups,
at least those with a calling to social action, offer views which are in
some measure a counterweight to the values of secular modernity.
The presence of such counterweights strengthens pluralism, and
hence stands to strengthen liberal society itself.
21. For a small sample of American social criticism along these lines, see, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF DI-
MINISHING EXPECTATIONS (1978); JULES HENRY, CULTURE AGAINST MAN (1963); PAUL
GOODMAN, GROWING Up ABSURD (1957).
22. Value pluralism is identified with the thought of Sir Isaiah Berlin and pervades
his writings. See supra note 3.

